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Law and the Future:

Legal Education
By Brainerd Currie*

N

Oman ever leaped clear-eyed from his bed, crying "Go to! I

will write a paper on the future of legal education," and proceeded to do so forthwith.1 The process by which such papers come
into existence is rather different. In the beginning, there is that
superlatively regrettable moment of surrender to the blandishments of an editor with an Idea. This is followed by a long period
of bleak unproductivity, during which the putative writer attempts
half-heartedly and without success to delude himself with the assurance that something will come to mind even while he gives his
attention to other matters. The next phase is marked by an almost
irresistible compulsion to treat the subject facetiously; but the
promise of this line of attack fades rapidly as, one after another,
the humorous devices which present themselves are rejected as
both ponderous and incompatible with the spirit of the occasion. As
the deadline approaches, bringing with it something like panic, the
writer turns to defensive and evasive tactics, composing in his
mind opening paragraphs which more or less elaborately protest
that he is not endowed with the gift of prophecy. But this is merely
to state the obvious, and perversely to misinterpret the purpose of
the symposium. No one ever supposed for a moment that he was so
endowed; a symposium on the future of the law is, of course,
merely a device for inducing the contributors to select from current
and impending problems those which they regard as most signifi* Professor of Law. University of Chicago. Dean, Law School, University of
Pittsburgh, 1952-53. Editor of the JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUcATION, 1947-49. A.B.,
Mercer Univ., 1937, LL.B., 1935; LL.M., Columbia Univ. 1941, J.S.D., 1955.
1. In one way or another, though, more such papers get written than one
might suppose: Ballantine, Legal Education of the Future, 40 A.B.A.. 599 (1954) ;
Griswold, The Future of Legal Education, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 438 (1953) ; Levi, The
Future of Legal Education, in FoUR TALKS oN LEGAL EDUCATION 41 (1952); Caldwell, The Law School of the Future, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 388 (1949); McDougal, The
Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World
Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947); Hettrick The Future. of the Law School,
25 B.U.L. REv. 120 (1945); Oliphant, The Future of Legal Education, 6 Am. L.
ScH. REV. 329 (1928); Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233
(1924) ; Editorial, The. Future of Legal Education, 56 L.T. 121 (1873). In addition, papers of the same type appear under more modest titles: Gavit, Where
Do We Go From Here in Legal Education?, 23 RocKY MT. L. REV. 24 (1950);
Cheatham, Legal Education-Some Predictions, 26 TEXAS L. REv. 174 (1947);
Harno, Whither Legal Education?, J. BAR ASS'N OF D.C. 483 (1943); Katz, What
Changes Are Practicalin Legal Education?, 27 A.B.A.J. 759 (1941); Clark, Law
Professor, What Now?, 20 A.B.A.J. 431 (1934); Horack, Law Schools of Today
and Tomorrow, 6 Am. L. SCH. REv. 653 (1930); Hall, The Next Task of the Law
School, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 42 (1925); Lee, Looking Forward, 30 HARV. L. REV.
792 (1917) ; Mechem, The Opportunities and Responsibilities of American Law
Schools, 5 MicH. L. REv. 344 (1907); Jenks, Possibilities in Legal Education, 23
L.Q. REv. 266 (1907) ; Editorial, The Prospects of Legal Education, 16 SOL. J. &
REP. 337 (1872).
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cant, and to comment on them perhaps more forthrightly than they
otherwise would. There is no escape; the assignment is not an unreasonable one; yet weeks pass, and the writer still has not found
courage to commit to paper his first pronouncement on what the
condition of legal education will, or must, or should be fifty years
hence.
These difficulties began to yield, in my case, only when I came to
the belated realization that the assignment might be interpreted
as calling for a discussion not of the status of legal education fifty
years from now, but of the course of development of legal education during the next fifty years. The difference may not be a radical one, but it at least serves to break the ice. For the next halfcentury of legal education begins tomorrow-or, at the latest, next
year; and it requires no great amount of either foresight or conviction to affirm that legal education next year will be very much
like what it is today. A few of our colleagues will retire; some-as
we are becoming increasingly aware-will die; the students we
know best will graduate; a few new casebooks will be published;
some courses will be added, and some dropped; an eastern school
will announce a comprehensive reorganization of its curriculum;
there may even be a new Internal Revenue Code to delight the tax
men and spawn new institutes; but future historians will not record 1956-57 as the year in which legal education was revolutionized. They may, indeed, trace some future revolutionary development to its origin in an obscure idea or experiment which, unknown
to us, is to make its appearance in the course of the year; but great
changes themselves will not occur in 1956-57.
Moreover, the essential sameness of legal education, at least to
outward appearances, will continue deep into the next half-century.
We can see this in the new law buildings which are going up all
over the country. In a very literal sense, these structures provide
the framework within which legal education must develop for at
least fifty years. And are they imaginative conceptions of what will
be required to house the shining new functions of a legal education
of the future? They are not. They are projections of legal education as it exists today. They represent our best efforts to tabulate
all our present functions and to facilitate their more gracious and
commodious performance; but, despite our talk of planning for
expansion and flexibility, they neither envisage nor permit anything very different. They do not even embody our present convictions as to certain changes which ought to come about in the
interest of improved training. We agree, quite generally, that the
weakest part of our apparatus is the large class. Dean Griswold,
speaking recently on "The Future of Legal Education," said:
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The law schools of the future, I prophesy, will provide less
mass instruction than they have in the past. They will offer

individualized work
more small classes, more opportunity for
2
of one sort or another for their students.

Yet no building plans I have seen fail to provide classrooms larger
than the largest in the building to be replaced. We tell ourselves
that such planning preserves freedom of choice for the future, and

in justification we point to the fact that every new building contains a few elegantly designed seminar rooms; but this is hardly
candid. If we build large classrooms their very existence will condition our future thinking and that of our successors, and the cost
of leaving them idle will be a powerful deterrent to change. The
truth is, of course, that smaller classes and individualized instruction mean not only better but much more expensive legal education; and we cannot commit ourselves to such a program without
assurances, which we do not have, that the requisite financial support will be available. Of necessity, in our most conscious planning
for the future we tend to perpetuate things as they are.
A second condition which makes for continuity (to use a
pleasanter term than "sameness") in legal education is the accumulated supply of teaching materials. The current directory in
the HarvardLaw Review, which seems less than exhaustive, lists
168 extant casebooks. These represent a very substantial investment of publishing capital, which would not have been made in the
absence of good reason to suppose that the publications would be
accepted as teaching tools over an appreciable period of time.
Blackboard and Chalk's Cases and Materials on the Docking of Entails will not become obsolete overnight. Like other casebooks, it
has a roughly predictable life expectancy, and will lose its place in
the active list only as it is gradually superseded by competing collections or as the course becomes less popular. The actuarial expectations of the publishers are a more reliable guide to the future
than any wishful predictions of mine; therefore, I do not anticipate
profound changes in the materials of law study for a good many
years to come.
Still other conditions which militate against change could be
enumerated. There is the matter of our own skills and capacities:
we are not likely suddenly to devaluate our stock in trade, nor to
learn radically different techniques. There is the matter of procedure: most programmatic changes of any moment must win the
2. 5 J. LEGAL ED. 438, 444 (1953). Dean Griswold added: "I do not prophesy
the elimination of large classes. In the hands of qualified teachers they can be
excellent instruments for legal education in many fields. But I do prophesy that a
considerably larger portion of law school instruction will be in smaller classes
or on an individualized basis." Ibid.
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approval of a curriculum committee, a faculty, a dean, an administration, a bar association, a foundation, a publisher, or a combination of some or all of these. There is the fact that law itself
changes slowly, and that the task of dealing with some of its lesser
problems seems endless. Exactly fifty years ago, in the first issue
of the Illinois Law Review, Professor Wigmore was saying:
The statute (c. 51, §§2, 4) against admitting an interested
survivor to the stand is thoroughly unsound, in principle and
in 'practice.... Repeal it at once.3
It is conducive to the development of a philosophic attitude concerning dynamism in law and legal education to note that in 1956
every operative provision, almost every comma and syllable, of the
statute in question remains intact; even the citation remains
accurate.4 Fifty years from now, no doubt, teachers of evidence
will still be saying that sections 2 and 4 of chapter 51 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes are unsound.
But perhaps it is unnecessary to adduce elaborate arguments to
prove that the principle of inertia applies to legal education. I must
confess that, in common with everyone else, I have been aware of
this phenomenon for some time. If I dwell on it now as if it were a
new discovery, the reason is that it seems to take on new interest
and significance in the context of an attempted discussion of the
future of legal education. Not only so, but a strange thing has happened: whereas I used to think of the inertia of legal education
with impatience, and perhaps a trace of contempt, I find myself, in
this context, savoring the fact, and finding it, on the whole, a
source of satisfaction.
In part, this euphoria stems from the circumstance that recognition of the principle of inertia simplifies the task of writing about
the future of legal education. Not only will things remain pretty
much the same for a long time to come; changes, when they do
come, will have to overcome formidable forces of resistance, and
will have to come slowly, well heralded, and amply supported by
general opinion. We can therefore put aside Utopian hopes and
marginal possibilities, and narrow the field of discussion to such
changes as may be expected to result from acute discontent with
specific aspects of the existing order, from the further growth and
acceptance of innovations of yesteryear which have exhibited a
degree of viability, and from the more irresistible of external pressures.
3. Some Evidence Statutes that Illinois Ought to Have, 1 ILL. L. REv. 9, 14
(1906).
4. Ir. REv. STAT. c.51, §§2, 4 (1955). In 1951 §2 was amended, in recognition
of the progress of moder
science, to substtute "person who is mentally ill" for
"idiot,. .. lunatic, or distracted person." Ill. Laws, 1951, at 1559.
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The principal basis for my feeling of relative contentment, however, is broader than the transient self-interest connected with the
preparation of this paper. I should be very much surprised to discover that I am fundamentally a conservative in my attitude toward legal education, and certainly I am not complacent about its
achievements. While I should not care to reiterate Karl Llewellyn's
timeless indictment, that legal education is "so inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul that it will take twenty years of unremitting
effort to make it half-way equal to its job," 5 I am conscious of many
respects in which improvement is sorely needed. Nevertheless, I
have come to be distrustful of reform measures. We are inclined, in
our perpetual concern for betterment, to be too much like the conscientious man who, in his aspiration to be a better father, thinks
in terms of a newer automobile, a better house, an older college,
and a more distant vacation-forgetful that, important as such
matters may be, his temper at the breakfast table may be more so.
For the ills of legal education we tend to prescribe longer periods
of pre-law training, added courses, legal aid clinics, internships,
curriculum revision and extension, "centers" for research and public service, and-not necessarily as a last resort-regulatory action
by an accrediting agency. We are especially prone to emphasize
formal arrangements when, essaying the historian's function, we
attempt to identify significant developments of the past. Thus
when I took it upon myself to list the "epochal" events of legal
education in America, I selected Thomas Jefferson's creation of a
professorship of law at William and Mary in 1779, the establishment of the Litchfield School in 1784, the reorganization of the
Harvard Law School under Joseph Story in 1829, Langdell's introduction of the case method in 1870, the founding of the Harvard
Law Review in 1887, the formation of the Association of American
Law Schools in 1900, and, dubitante, the Columbia faculty's efforts
in the 1920's to reorganize the curriculum for the reception of the
social sciences. 6 In the sense that I cannot think of a better one, I
am prepared to defend that enumeration; but surely it gives nothing like an adequate or meaningful account of what has actually
been happening. According to my reckoning, only one development
of outstanding importance has occurred since the turn of the cen5. On What Is Wrong With So-called Legal Education, 35 COLUm. L. REv.
651, 678 (1935).
6. Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL ED. 331 (1951). In a footnote I conceded that there was something to be said for recognition of certain
other developments: (1) the establishment of public law as a major component
of the curriculum, (2) the increased attention given to legislation, (3) the hospitality displayed toward the "cultural" courses-jurisprudence, comparative law,
Roman law, and legal history, and (4) the interest in legal clinics and related
devices. Id. at 332, n.2.
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tury; but I have not the slightest doubt that in that time legal
education has changed profoundly, and for the better. It has gained
in depth, in breadth, in dignity, in perceptiveness, and in humaneness. It has grown in this way largely because of countless developments and influences too small to be caught in the historian's net
-most of them having to do with the dedication of individual law
teachers. A more meaningful survey might well locate a "milestone" at each point where a young instructor wrote his first law
review article, or gained insight or inspiration from a colleague, or
decided that the preparation of new materials for his course was
more important than his rose garden. The classic inertia of legal
education does not inhibit developments of this order as it does programmatic and institutional innovations. Now that we have attained a decent level of minimum standards, and now that most
reasonable proposals for pretentious change are being open-mindedly tested in at least some quarters, we could contemplate without
dismay a half-century free from "epochal" events if we could
expect a maximum of the kind of improvement that results only
from individual effort.
My first specific forecast is related to these reflections. The forecast is that the next fifty years will bring law teachers relief from
much of the deadly drudgery which takes such a toll of their time,
their energy, and their initiative. The relation consists in the fact
that such a consummation not only would release the most potent
forces available for the improvement of legal education, but is
attainable, in good part, by individual action and informal cooperation. Why do we inflict upon ourselves the cruel and incapacitating task of grading piles of bluebooks? Many of us, as though
obsessed, sacrifice weeks out of every year to the performance of
this debilitating and unrewarding rite. Delegation of the task to
readers is, of course, not a solution; we are much too conscientious
for that, and, besides, no one who has the training and intelligence
to evaluate the answers to a law school examination should waste
his time in doing so, whether he is reader or professor. The solution will come with the more general acceptance of objective examination techniques. I suppose I shall be among the diehard opponents of such a deliverance. Having little skill in the construction of
objective questions, I shall continue to make a virtue of my ignorance, pointing out that such questions lack the subtlety of the essay
type, and that it is impossible by such means to evoke the creative
imagination of the superior student. In the end, though, even I will
yield to the weight of evidence showing that objective questions
can test and differentiate as well as any-and to the crushing
burden of grading essay-type examinations. The process of eman-
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cipation could be speeded if those among us who have achieved
their freedom would be less modest and more communicative concerning their skill and experience. Indeed, since the construction of
good objective questions is at best an exacting task, but one that
can be shared, it is reasonable to anticipate the growth of informal
cooperation among individual teachers, perhaps ultimately leading
to the availability of something like sets of standard examinations
within certain course areas.
A less gruelling, but still consuming, form of drudgery consists
in the routine aspects of legal research. Without impairment of
scholarly standards, we could liberate a goodly store of our energies
simply by a more realistic approach to the question of what operations in legal research are delegable. In the main, however, the
problem is one of funds and manpower. Well before the lapse of
fifty years-I hope-every law school will have a working reference librarian, and, where faculty productivity warrants it, teachers will be provided with research assistance at least to the extent
that stenographic assistance is now provided. Where the funds will
come from I do not know. When I mention this hope to my more
knowing colleagues, I am told that the foundations probably will
not provide support for unspecified, individual research in law. If
this is true, it is unfortunate both for the foundations and for
legal education. I have nothing to say against organized and programmed research, with its lofty objectives, unless it is a stricture
to say that it is no substitute for the research which individual
teachers are impelled to undertake for the satisfaction of their own
curiosity, the solution of their immediate problems, and the integrity of their day-to-day teaching. This is the kind of inquiry that
arises immediately out of the concerns of the educational process,
and the kind whose results are most readily assimilated. The donor
who wishes to maximize his return in beneficial impact on the development of legal education will provide for the use of local
discretion to release and supplement the kaleidoscopic energies of
individual teachers.
Even when the money is available, however, we shall be hard put
to find qualified people whom we can conscientiously ask to do this
work. Any substantial reliance on research assistants presupposes
a high degree of competence, and the need will increase for competence in extra-legal research as well. So far as our own undergraduates are concerned, the limitations on their abilities are less
important than the limitations on the extent to which we can
properly encroach on their time-although work of this kind might,
indeed, be a good substitute for part-time work of the sort in which
they commonly engage. It seems likely that we shall turn to the
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enlistment of recent graduates, thereby adding another to the
growing list of short-term, junior-professional employment opportunities, which already includes judicial clerkships, tutorial appointments, and staff work on organized research projects. This is
a prospect not to be contemplated without misgiving unless we are
prepared to invest the work of the research assistant with a reasonable degree of responsibility, and perhaps in addition to combine it with other significant work, such as that of the graduate
legal aid clinics which Dean Levi has suggested7 The prospective
multiplication of employment opportunities of this sort is in its own
right a matter which should cause us some concern, postponing as
it does the graduate's attainment of full professional status without the assurance of compensating educational values. It suggests
the potential re-creation of something akin to the old status of
apprenticeship; but, by contrast with modern internship requirements, it has at least the advantage that the graduate is reasonably compensated for his work.
Given more space and inspiration, I could perhaps amuse myself
at some length by commenting on various enthusiasms of recent
years and their prospects for the future. Foregoing that pleasure, I
shall confine myself somewhat capriciously to two which seem reasonably relevant to my principal theme, which is that the most important developments in the future of legal education will result
from what Mr. Justice Holmes has taught us to call molecular
8
rather than molar motion.
The first of these has to do with what is sometimes called
"audio-visual" education. The phrase itself is rather objectionable.
Listening and seeing are not new to legal education, and it has not
been my experience that the role of the olfactory, gustatory, and
tactile senses has been overemphasized. Idiomatically understood,
of course, the phrase means "mechanical and electronic" education,
and, so understood, it is even more objectionable. I confess to a
certain weakness of my own for gadgets, but, with great deference
to my friends who are sincerely interested in the potentialities of
modern inventions for legal education, I predict with some confidence that nothing of fundamental importance will result from
their efforts. The great difficulty is that this preoccupation with
education as a sensory experience posits the student as a passive
vessel, whereas, if we have learned anything, it is that he must be
an active participant. Audio-visual techniques offer to mechanize
legal education when we know, if we know anything, that what it
needs is to be personalized. If we have lost faith in the efficacy of
7. What Can The Law Schools Do?, 18 U. CI. L. REv. 746 (1951).
8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
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a lecturer appearing in the flesh before a body of supine students,
it is hard to see why even the miracle of electronics should lead
us to have confidence in his image or his recorded voice. It is not
unlikely that from time to time procedures will be developed for
employing electro-mechanical devices in aid of meaningful educational experiences, but the effect on the basic character and problems of legal education will not be great. The future belongs to
people, not machines. 9
The attempt to invoke the aid of the social sciences is, without
much question, the most important of recent developments in legal
education. I have previously said substantially all I have to say for
the time being on this subject,'0 but the invitation to state one's
views in the form of a prediction is a challenge to put them concretely and clearly. It occurs to me, therefore, that perhaps the
problem with respect to the social sciences might be stated better
than it has been. If we are told that law is a benighted discipline,
and that for its enlightenment we must unlock the rich resources
of modern psychology, economics, sociology, criminology, and the
rest, it is not surprising that we are simply overwhelmed. If that
is the problem, I cannot predict that much progress will be made
toward its solution in the next fifty years. The rhetoric whereby we
seek to emphasize the importance of an objective may well block
progress toward its attainment by inducing a sense of frustration.
Is it not possible to put the problem in more modest and more feasible terms? The essential fault of legal education is that we do not
know certain things that we need to know in order to form critical
judgments. When the soundness of a rule was tested by history or
logic or authority, the essential knowledge was not hard to come
by. But the pragmatic spirit entered legal education, and it has
become necessary to judge rules in terms of their effects. This is
embarrassing, because, knowing little about the effects of rules, we
are compelled either to rely on unverified assumptions or to confess
ignorance. We have also come to recognize that particular rules of
law exist not because, in the nature of things, they must, but because there is policy to be effectuated; but we know little about
how to ascertain policy and make it explicit. What teacher of Contracts can produce an intellectually satisfying demonstration that
the doctrine of consideration serves-or does not serve-a useful
purpose? How can the Supreme Court judge whether the applica9. See Wriston, How To Finance Higher Education in the Future, 301 ANNALS
196, 196-97 (1955). Do not see id. at 197-98, where President Wriston (of Brown
University) satirizes that object of my recent enthusiasm, the objective examination.

10. Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J.
(1955).

LEGAL

ED. 331 (1951), 8 id. 1
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tion of state law to marine insurance cases is subversive of the
harmony and uniformity which are held desirable in laws affecting
the shipping industry?"- After we tell our students that it is fatuous to suppose that we can resolve conflicting policies of different
states by reference to talismanic irrelevancies, what can we offer
as a substitute? For that matter, how do we know that Professor
Wigmore was right in his denunciation of the Dead Man's Statute
as "unsound, in principle and in practice"? Diogenes will find his
quarry before you can find an evidence teacher who will doubt the
purity of that pearl of modern legal criticism; but has a conclusive
case against the statute been made? The indestructibility of the
statute suggests that the bar, at least, is not persuaded that it
does not serve the ends of justice.
The problem, then, is not the massive one of "integrating law
and the social sciences." It is only the aggregate of specific problems which confront individual teachers when they reach the limits
of their knowledge in the teaching of ordinary courses. We need
not all become masters of the "entire domain of the social and
philosophical disciplines," as Wilhelm Wundt is supposed to have
done. 12 What is needed is particular knowledge beyond the scope
of traditional legal research, relevant to the problem at hand. Attainment of such knowledge may often require the aid of specialists, may sometimes be impossible, may sometimes be a simple
matter of fact-gathering. When the problem is stated in this way,
I am encouraged to predict that the next fifty years will see material progress. Law teachers will not be content with their ignorance and their assumptions; they will attempt the solution of problems of manageable scale. Organized research has a part to play in
this process. The great contribution of such research, in the beginning, is not so much the discovery of mines of new information
as it is the development of procedures for investigation. Armed
with such procedures and with adequate assistance, individual
teachers can take over the task of determining what information
is relevant, and of gathering and assimilating it. For the grand
synthesis we can wait more than fifty years.
External pressures affecting legal education may be expected to
come from the bar, from foundations, and from the evolution of
society around us.
The bar will continue to press for more practical training, pointing to the admitted fact that law schools do not fully equip their
graduates for practice. There is not much to be added to the peren11. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
12. OGBURN AND GOLDENWEISER, THE SocIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS 1 (1927).
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nial debate on this subject. It occurs to me, however, that one
small observation may be in point. Among the little-noticed results
of the transfer of law training from the offices to the universities
was that the cost of training the profession's new recruits, to the
extent that it was not borne by the students themselves, was
shifted from the profession to the general public. The public interest in the quality of the bench and bar and of public servants has
justified the shift, because the capacity of the universities to provide superior intellectual training has been demonstrated. On what
grounds, however, can the profession justify a demand that the
public assume the whole cost of preparing young men to perform
work which, whatever its societal implications, has as its immediate object the production of income for themselves and the firms
that employ them? My hope for the future is that the profession
will continue to provide all that training which it can provide more
efficiently than the universities, and to bear the cost of doing so.
The profession has been primarily responsible for the elevation
of standards for admission to the bar. Since 1900, we have moved
from a condition of no general standards to a prevailing requirement of three years of college, three of law school, and a bar examination. But for one fact, I would be inclined to predict that this
remarkable achievement would satisfy us for a while, and that no
substantial increase would be necessary in the next fifty years. The
fact which has to be reckoned with, however, is that, whereas our
present law students have been selected from an annual crop of
babies averaging, in 1930-35, less than two and a half million, the
law students of twenty to twenty-five years hence will be selected
from the current baby crop, which is averaging better than four
million a year.18 Dean Griswold has predicted that "the next fifty
years will find greatly increased opportunities of employment for
well-trained lawyers."1 4 I hope he is right. But I predict that the
opportunities for employment will increase less rapidly than the
number of applicants for admission to the bar; and it follows that,
in response to pressure from the bar, standards for admission will
be raised.
I realize that this is a cynical statement. It amounts to saying
that educational requirements for admission will be raised without
substantial justification in terms of educational policy, for the purpose of controlling access to the privileges of the profession. I hope
13. "[F]or the nation as a whole the number of persons who will be of college
age each autumn is a projection and not a prediction. They are here with us as
infants, children, and adolescents. There will be 2,300,000 eighteen-year-olds in
1955; 2,800,000 in 1960; 3,700,000 in 1970; and 4,000,000 in 1971!" Brown, A LongRange View of Higher Education, 301 ANNALS 1, 3 (1955).
14. The Future of Legal Education, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 438, 445 (1953).
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it is a wrong statement, but I am afraid it has support in history.
I do not, of course, say that past improvements in educational
standards have been without educational justification. I do say
that they have been brought about primarily through the efforts
of the bar; that at times the restrictive motive has been conspicuously the dominant one; and that no substantial educational justification is apparent for a general increase in the near future. I very
much hope that, before we increase the general pre-law requirement to four years, extend the law course to four, and add a year
or two of "internship," we will make certain that we sincerely believe this to be a better use of the lives of young men and women
than we now dictate. Even if the plenitude of our economy during
the next fifty years permits such a postponement of entry into
productive activity, there are grave questions to be asked about
the wisdom of postponing further the age at which men become
self-reliant and achieve full maturity and responsibility. I sometimes think it is a blessing that bar associations have no control
over the human period of gestation.
I suppose it is indelicate to suggest that pressures bearing on
legal education may emanate from eleemosynary foundations, and
I hasten to emphasize that I do not for a moment suggest that
foundation officials would deliberately bring pressure to bear. But
they have no choice. It is their responsibility to make decisions as
to what constitutes the wise distribution of large sums of money.
Law schools will naturally plead the cause of legal education. In
some instances they will be successful, and grants will be made
which will enable some schools to carry out projects which they
have long believed to be essential to their function. To grant to one
is to withhold from others. Under the pressure of being left out,
schools which have been skeptical of the value, to them, of projects
which have found favor will undertake agonizing reappraisals. My
hope for the future is that in petitioning for foundation support
the law schools will always be motivated by sincere conviction as to
what is in the interest of legal education, and never by any consideration of what is required to come within a foundation's sphere of
interest. This hope, I predict, will be disappointed here and there.
As we turn, finally, to developments which may be expected to
result from the awesome pace of civilization in general, I am aware
that this paper ought to take on the apocalyptic tone of a commencement address, but I must apologize to any editors or readers
who may be disappointed by the absence of such oratory. Of course
it is a truism that the future of legal education depends on the
future of everything else, but I am not sure just what the appropriate relation is between changes in technology and world politics
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and adaptation in legal education. To be sure, the next fifty years
will be an age of atomic weapons and energy, automation, wars of
varying temperatures, supersonic transportation, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and assaults on the frontiers of space. The past
fifty years have not been uneventful, either; yet in that period
legal education has not undergone, nor do I suppose it should have
been expected to undergo, anything like a corresponding process of
development. Furthermore, I am not sure that I have any great
faith in the kind of measures to which we typically resort when
we gird ourselves to prepare the future lawyer for his new and
great responsibilities. Legal education does not always lag. Within
two years of Hiroshima a course on legal implications of atomic
energy, entitled "Recent Scientific Developments and the Law,"
6
i5
appeared in the summer curriculum at Yale. It has not survived,'
and I cannot grieve-not only because such topical adjustments
constitute an unworkable method of dealing with our myriad problems, but also because they divert attention from an indefinable
fundamental. I would not deny that the outlook for world peace
calls for increased emphasis on international law, but I should not
like to see us inaugurate new courses on international law and
congratulate ourselves on having taken care of the problem.
Exactly fifty years ago, Professor Floyd R. Mechem, of the University of Chicago, said, as I might be saying, mutatis mutandis, in
this connection:
Contemplate for a moment what it means to be able to train
men who directly and indirectly are to exercise the most potent
influence over the growth and development of our law. We
have in this country today, I suppose, considerably over one
hundred law schools with something like fourteen thousand
students. Think what it would mean if the thirty-five hundred
or so young men who now go out yearly from these law schools
to every town and city in the land could go with not only the
best possible training in the law, but with the highest possible
ideals as to its duties and responsibilities and the strongest
possible ambition for its improvement and advancement. 1 7
Well, they had problems in 1906, too. Among others, they had the
problem of race relations and the equal protection of the laws. And
how have the law schools handled their opportunities and responsibilities in that regard? In the constitutional crisis which has
followed the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the school
15. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy
Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1350 (1947).
16. Perhaps the current course in "Law, Science, and Policy" is a more viable
successor.
17. The Opportunities and Responsibilities of American Law Schools, 5 MICH.
L.
rav. 344, 346 (1907) (an address delivered August 28, 1906).
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segregation cases, ninety-six senators and representatives have
contributed a declaration repudiating the decision . 8s Seventy-four
of the signers are law-trained men-the products of some thirty
law schools. Plainly, legal education has failed to fulfill the hopes
expressed in statements like that of Professor Mechem. There is
not much point in repeating such hopes for the future without
analyzing the causes of the failure. We have failed even if, as some
may believe, the error consisted in overestimating the capacity for
growth of written constitutions, and in wrongly gauging the limitations of law as a means of social control. We have failed without
question if the error consisted in neglecting to inculcate an understanding of the essential conditions of constitutional government,
a respect for human dignity, and an appreciation of the obligation
of the lawyer to the law and to those who claim their rights under
the law. I do not charge the law schools with responsibility for the
conditions which have brought on the crisis, but I suggest that, if
the law schools had fulfilled their aspirations, we might be witnessing leadership of a different sort from seventy-four senators and
representatives, and from their brethren of the bench and bar.
In retrospect, what might the law schools have done? We had
courses on jurisprudence, legal ethics, and civil rights, and they
left their mark, but it was not enough. If we had had more such
courses, and added seminars on segregation, would that have
helped? Perhaps, but perhaps not enough. If our aspirations were
attainable at all, the way was not through such formal arrangements alone, but through concentration on what I have referred to
as an "indefinable fundamental." As the expression confesses, I
do not know quite what this means. I believe it means, for one
thing, that training for professional responsibility and for awareness of the role of law in society is not a matter that can be parceled out and assigned to certain members of the faculty at certain
hours, but is the job of all law teachers all of the time. It means
that we should be less concerned with seeking new things to do
than with doing better the things we already do fairly well. It
means that we should confront, and bring our students to confront,
the most explosive problems with which law may deal, facing all
the facts and plumbing all the issues to their full depth without
fear or prejudice. It means that each law teacher should joyfully
accept with Holmes the challenge that in his work he "may wreak
himself upon life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear
his heart out after the unattainable."' 19
102 CONG. Rac 3948 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1956).
19. THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1886), quoted in LERNER, THE MIND AND
FAITH OF JUSTIcE HOLMES 31 (1943).
18.
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This is all I have to say about the future to those whose profession is not legal education. To the law teacher I can say something
more meaningful: if you would know what legal education should
become, look into your own heart when you have finished a course
and read the examination papers. Then your shortcomings are
clear and acknowledged; you conceal nothing from yourself, you
are not attempting to impress others with your eloquence, you
have no panaceas to promote. If you-if all of us-will do about
half the things we know, in such moments of honest self-appraisal,
that we ought to do, we shall have reason to be gratified with our
progress in the next fifty years.

HeinOnline -- 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 272 1956-1957

